New Jersey Criminal Lawyer

 

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
September Terms  2010/2011

 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,              A-117-10
                      v.                                      067687

THOMAS J. SHANNON,
           PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.

 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
             PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,             A-18-11

v.                                    068220

THOMAS J. SHANNON,
            PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.

 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,                          A-21-11
                               v.                             068233

ANTONIO C. DESHAZO,
          DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,                         A-23-11
                              v.                             068248

AARON CROOMS, 

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

 

 Stare decisis is a principle to which we adhere for the

sake of certainty and stability. Luchejko v. City of Hoboken,

207 N.J.  191,  208  (2011); Watson v. United States Rubber Co.,  24

N.J.  598,  603  (1957); Lokar v. Church of the Sacred Heart,  24

N.J.  549,  568  (1957)  (Jacobs, J., dissenting)  (citing Bing v.
Thunig  (St. John’s Episcopal Hospital),  143 N.E.2d  3  (N.Y.

1957)).    It is nevertheless a  “flexible channel marker for

guidance” which should not be permitted to foreclose reanalysis
where it is warranted.    Caporossi v. Atlantic City,  220 F. Supp.
508,  521  (D.N.J.  1963); see also State v. Int’l Fed’n of Prof’l
& Tech. Eng’rs, Local  195,  169 N.J.  505,  534  (2001).    Indeed,
the nature of the judicial process requires the power to revise,
to limit, and to overrule if justice is to be done.    In re
Thompson,  53 N.J.  276,  299  (1969).    Among the relevant
considerations in determining whether to depart from precedent
are whether the prior decision is unsound in principle,
unworkable in practice, or implicates reliance interests.
Allied Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation,  504 U.S.  768,
783,  112 S. Ct.  2251,  2261,  119 L. Ed.  2d  533,  549  (1992).
     In these companion cases, the State asks the Court to
revisit its recent decision in State v. Pena-Flores,  198 N.J.  6
(2009), which addressed the proper standard for warrantless
searches of motor vehicles.    The State contends that the
decision’s impact on police practices and New Jersey motorists
provides special justification to overturn Pena-Flores.    As
support, the State relies in part on certain data taken only
from New Jersey State Police motor vehicle stops.    That data
represents a fraction of statewide encounters with motorists and
covers the limited period of time since Pena-Flores went into
effect.

We do not find sufficient support in the current record to establish the  “special justification” needed to depart from
precedent.    State v. Brown,  190 N.J.  144,  157  (2007)  (quoting
Dickerson v. United States,  530 U.S.  428,  443,  120 S. Ct.  2326, 2336,  147 L. Ed.  2d  405,  419  (2000)).    We rely on the Attorney General, the Public Defender, the American Civil Liberties
Union, appearing in this matter as amicus curiae, and other
interested non-parties to amass and develop a more thorough,
statistical record over time relating to motor vehicle stops by the State Police and local authorities.

To the extent that it is impractical to collect data from
local law enforcement throughout the entire State, data from
representative urban, suburban, and rural areas may suffice.
That information should include, where possible,  (a) the total
number of motor vehicle stops,  (b) the number of warrantless
probable cause searches conducted, consent searches requested,
consent searches conducted, and vehicles impounded  -- both

before and after Pena-Flores  -- and  (c) other relevant information.

Should a motor vehicle search that implicates Pena-Flores be challenged at some future time, we invite the parties to present an appropriate record for review.

These matters having been duly considered and the Court

having determined that certification was improvidently granted,